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Among other notable accomplishments, Richard 
Ryder is a survivor. Whereas others have come and 
gone, or seen their star rise only to fall, Ryder has 
demonstrated true British grit Today, after more than 
twenty years of activism on behalf of nonhuman 
animals, he is more not less committed, and his 
influence is larger not smaller. While this former young 
Turk, an original member of the Oxford Group, has 
become partof the animal welfare establishment (Ryder 
is past chairman ofthe Royal Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals [RSPCA] and currently serves 
as its vice-chairman), he has not lost his fITe or his 
vision. With the publication ofhis impressive historical 
work, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards 
Speciesism, Ryder has consolidated his position as one 
of the world's most informed, articulate and politically 
astute voices being raised against those speciesist 
attitudes and practices that keep nonhuman animals 
in bondage. 
Ryder's own career understandably is part of the 
history he tells. Though small in number, the members 
of the Oxford Group played-and many of them 
continue to play-a decisive role in the struggle for 
animal rights. In addition to Ryder, Andrew Linzey 
and Stephen Clark were part of the Group that was 
fonned in Oxford in the late 19608 and early 1970s, as 
were three young Oxford philosophers: Roslind and 
Stanley Godloviteh, and John Harris, who, in 1971, with 
the publication ofAnimals, Men and Morals: AnInquiry 
into the Maltreatment ofNon-humans (Gollancz), fired 
what many regard as the frrst volley in "the modem 
movement" for animal rights, a not altogether accurate 
characterization given the earlier, pioneering work of 
such figures as Helen Jones, for example. 
Peter Singer, who knew the members of the Oxford 
Group but was not himself a member while a student in 
Oxford, fired the next volley when, in 1973, he 
published his seminal review of Animals, Men and 
Morals in the New York Review ofBooks. Here was a 
case where a review proved to be even more important 
than the important book that was reviewed. Singer's 
briefagainst animal exploitation was clear, concise and 
compelling, and reader response was overwhelmingly 
favorable-so favorable, in fact, that the New York 
Review ofBooks itself took the unusual step ofactually 
publishing a book by Singer. 
That book was Animal Liberation. The year was 
1975, the same year Ryder published Victims ofScience: 
The Use ofAnimals in Science (Davis-Poynter), "one 
of the centIal books of the animal liberation movement," 
in Brigid Brophy's words. A year laterAndrew Linzey's 
Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment of Man's 
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Treatment ofAnimals (SCM Press) was published, and 
a year after that saw Stephen Clark's The Moral Status 
of Animals (Oxford). By 1977, then, the modem 
movement was well launched, and the small band of 
progressive anti-speciesists who comprised the Oxford 
Group (Ryderhad coined the term "speciesism" in 1970) 
played a historically decisive role in launching it 
Ryder's role has been more than theoretical. He has 
been, and continues to be, a man of action, and it was 
in no small measure because of his leadership that the 
RSPCA has experienced what many regard as a 
significant period of reform. Moreover, Ryder, along 
with Andrew Linzey, oversaw the organization of the 
historically important 1977 Cambridge Conference on 
Animal Rights, so-called because it was held at Trinity 
College, Cambridge University, the proceedings of 
which were later published as Animals' Rights: A 
Symposium (Centaur, 1979). Ryder drafted "A 
Declaration Against Speciesism" that was signed by 150 
of the attendees. The Declaration reads as follows: 
Inasmuch as we believe that there is ample 
evidence that many other species are capable 
of feeling, we condemn totally the infliction 
of suffering upon our brother and sister 
animals, and the curtailment of their enjoy-
ment, unless it be necessary for their own 
individual benefit. 
We do not accept that a difference in species 
alone (any more than a difference in race) can 
justify wanton exploitation or oppression in 
the name of science or sport, or for food, 
commercial profit or other human gain. 
We believe in the evolutionary and moral 
kinship ofall animals and we declare our belief 
that all sentient creatures have rights to life, 
liberty and the quest for happiness. 
We call for the protection of these rights. 
Of this declaration, Ryder notes that it was "youthful 
and idealistic in tone" (p. 197). Of the conference itself, 
he observes that it "was not only a novelty for the 
RSPCA, it was the first serious conference ever held 
anywhere, which was devoted entirely to animal rights, 
and I hope, the last such occasion at which meat was 
offered to those staying forlunch!" (p. 198). That hope, 
like the declaration, has proven to be "youthful and_ 
idealistic." At a major international conference in 1990, 
organized by the RSPCA and held at Christ College, 
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Oxford, meat dishes, ranging from morning sausage 
and bacon to cuts of pork and beef, were offered at 
each of the meals. Only after enough of those in 
attendance raised their collective voice in opposition 
were veal and venison removed from the menu. The 
moral conscience of the majority was salved when 
chicken and salmon were substituted, while, like 
proverbial untouchables, vegans were asked to sit en 
masse at a table of their own. 
The history of the modem movement, including the 
important contributions by members of the Oxford 
Group, is but one part of the large historical landscape 
Ryder presents, a landscape that traces the attitudes of 
humans to other animals from the cave paintings of 
Lascaux and Altamira up to, and beyond, the activities 
of the Animal Liberation Front In between there are 
separate chapters on ''The Christian Legacy: Medieval 
Attitudes" and ''The International Movement, 1700-
1960," for example. Without wishing to disparage 
Ryder's contributions to our understanding of these 
different times and nations, it remains true that his book 
is for the most part a history ofBritish attitudes toward 
nonhuman animals, and it is as a contribution to the 
history of these attitudes that its real significance will 
be measured. 
The British portrait, as drawn by Ryder, is not a 
pretty one. Even into the latter part of the eighteenth 
century people made sport ofeating live cats at country 
fairs, and considerable ingenuity was shown in 
arranging bloody, fatal contests between animals. These 
and other blood sports, as well as bear, boar and bull 
baiting, found favor among the "lower" classes and in 
part helped form Continental perception of the British 
as coarse and cruel. Indeed, Ryder himself is moved to 
observe that "perhaps it was partly because Britain had 
been the cruelest nation in Europe that it led the humane 
reaction over the next two decades" (p. 64). 
And lead they did, from the less well-known but 
visionary theology of Humphrey Primatt, whose 1776 
book. The Duty ofMercy and the Sin ofCruelty to Brute 
Animals, still deserves to be read, to the better-known 
poets of compassion---Pope, Goldsmith, Burns, Blake, 
Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron" and Shelley, for 
example---and the philosophers Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill, whose utilitarian enfranchisement of 
all sentient animals into the moral community continues 
to exercise its IX>werand influence even today. Themodern 
movement, it seems safe to say, would not be what it is if 
these creative pioneers had not paved the way. 
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The history of the British struggleagainst speciesism 
is more than the emergence of new voices in theology, 
poetry, and philosophy. Part of this struggle has been 
waged in the trenches ofparliament, and the story Ryder 
tells will not gladden the hearts of partisans of animal 
rights. Perhaps it is not surprising that the fust animal 
protection bill introduced before parliament, which 
would have prohibited bull baiting, was defeated (this 
was in April of 18(0), or that other proposed legislation 
also failed. Sadly, it was another twenty-two years 
before the fust animal protection legislation, the famous 
Martin Act, was passed. But it is more than surprising, 
it is disconcerting to learn that the 1876 Cruelty to 
Animals Act actually afforded more protection to 
scientists using nonhuman animals in their research than 
it provided the animals themselves, and that it was more 
than another hundred years before that act was 
amended, with few gains, in the eyes of many critics, 
for the animals. 
Still efforts were made, and like-minded people 
began to join in common cause so as to exert their 
collective power on behalfofanimal protection. Under 
the leadership of Rev. Arthur Broome, the Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was launched on 
June 16, 1824; when, in 1840, Queen Victoria gave her 
blessing, this Society became the Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and earned, by the 
fact of the queen's public endorsement of the cause of 
animal protection, a degree of"fashionableness" it had 
not been able to achieve on its own. 
From the outset the RSPCA was conservative in 
every sense of the word. It sought to disassociate itself 
from "extremists," including Lewis Gompertz, author 
ofMoral Inquiries on the Situation ofMan and Brutes 
(1824), who, in addition to refusing to ride in horse-
drawn carriages, refused on principle to eat other 
animals. In addition, the RSPCA displayed a marked 
tendency to oppose cruelty when it was attributable to 
the working-class while turning a blind eye to the finer 
cruelties of the affluent This double standard was too 
much for Mill's sense of social justice; writing to the 
secretary on 26 July 1868, he divested himself from 
the RSPCA for as long as "it is thought necessary or 
advisable to limit the Society's operations to the 
offences committed by the uninfluential classes of 
society." Evidently the Society never changed, since 
Mill never rejoined. As Ryder explains, in what many 
will find to be the most interesting, instructive part of 
his book, these divisive conflicts among the very people 
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who sought to help nonhuman animals were to increase, 
both in number and intensity, during the next hundred 
years, a point I return to below. 
Even while conflicts increasedand intensified, Ryder 
believes that the cause of animal protection made 
progress in Britain during the nineteenth century. It 
would be tempting to attribute this to the growing 
willingness to accept Darwin's theory of evolution. 
Ryder disagrees. Today, it is true, appeals to Darwin 
are commonplace. If humans and other animals 
resemble one another in morally relevant ways, then it 
would be rationally indefensible to treat them in 
radically different ways. People appeal to Darwin to 
replace the "if' with a "because": Because (as Darwin 
has shown) humans and other animals resemble one 
another in morally relevant ways, it is rationally 
indefensible to treat them in radically different ways. 
According to Ryder, the situation was quite different 
in Darwin's day. The principle advocates ofhis theory 
back then were his scientific peers, including the growing 
army of vivisectors, and although Darwin himself 
abhorred vivisection and abandoned a possible career 
in medicine because he could not bear to vivisect, 
animal protectionists, in a classic case ofconfusing the 
message with the messengers, were among the theory's 
most vocal critics. Precisely because vivisectors 
championed the theory ofevolution, those who opposed 
vivisection opposed the theory. Perhaps there is a lesson 
to be learned here, and in one sense, of course, there is: 
We ought not to confuse the message with the 
messenger. That's the easy part. The hard part is to 
carry out this wise injunction in practice-as if, for 
example, those who oppose vivisection must oppose 
all biotechnology, because vivisectors support it. 
Why, then, in view of the relative impotence of 
Darwin's theory to account for the progress in animal 
protection, did the cause of animals make progress in 
the nineteenth century? Ryder's explanation seems to 
be sociopolitical. That Queen Victoria would lend her 
royal name to a cause lent that cause a certain credibility, 
to be sure, and the discovery of anaesthetic also played 
a role. But far and away the most important changes 
concerned, first, the emergence of a growing middle 
class, and, second, the blessing of a comparatively long 
period of national peace. Ryder writes: 
As for the industrial revolution, it increased 
atlluence and created a large middle class [and] 
liberated some minds to ponder the plight of 
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nonhumans... [a] tendency [that] was aug-
mented by the fact that Britain in the nineteenth 
century enjoyed an almost unprecedented 
period of peace which stretched, interrupted 
only by the Crimean and colonial campaigns 
(which never, of course, produced any fear of 
invasion) from 1815 till the end of the century. 
After the 18308 the middle and upper middle 
class felt relatively safe; few external threats 
distracted them from considering the suffering 
of others (p. 165). 
For a variety of reasons, then, these "others" in time 
came to be seen to include other (nonhuman) animals. 
Again, I return to this finding of Ryder's below. 
Earlier I mentioned the theme of division and 
conflict, as it emerges in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century in Britain. If there is some one person more 
responsible than any other for this, it may be Frances 
Power Cobbe, whom Ryder characterizes as "the most 
doughty and effective anti-vivisectionist of the 
nineteenth century" (p. 108). Cobbe's life has been 
well told by John Vyvyan in his In Pity and in Anger, 
frrst published in 1969 and reprinted in 1987 (Micah 
Press). Ryder's account lacks some of the verve and 
humor of Vyvyan's, but the main outlines bring this 
remarkable woman alive. 
Dissatisfied with the conservative, incremental, 
regulatory approach to vivisection favored by the 
RSPCA, Cobbe decided to pursue an abolitionist 
agenda. This led her to form, in November, 1875, the 
Victoria Street Society, later to be renamed the National 
Anti-Vivisection Society (NAVS), which Cobbe ably 
led for more than two decades, only to find herself and 
her allies out-voted in the NAVS elections of 1898, 
whereupon she formed the British Union Against 
Vivisection (BUAV). 
Cobbe did not carry her opposition to vivisection to 
the dinner table. Like Gompertz before her, Anna 
Kingsford thought a consistent anti-vivisectionism 
included vegetarianism, and like her conservative 
opponents in the RSPCA, Cobbe did not. And so it 
was that these two powerful, visionary and magnetic 
women, each committed in her way to the cause of 
animal protection, had an association better known for 
its antipathy than its warmth. 
Kingsford and Cobbe's relationship is a microcosm 
of the macrocosmic patterns of conflict that have 
characterized not only the British but also the American 
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"animal movement" during the last hundred years. 
There is, frrst, the all too common conflict between 
strong personalities, especially when those who clash, 
whether for reasons of temperament or philosophy, all 
want to lead Second, there are those conflicts that arise 
as a result of alternative conceptions of the goals of 
animal protection. Is it only some research involving 
nonhuman animals that should be stopped, or all of it? 
Should we work: to get these animals offpeople's plates, 
orjust out of scientists' cages? As we see, the currently 
fashionable distinction between advocates of "animal 
welfare" and partisans of "animal rights" was fore--
shadowed in a previous age, as was the divisiveness 
this distinction can help create and sustain. 
Moreover, even among those who share the same 
goals, and even assuming they are not divided by 
reasons ofpersonality, the possibility of irreconcilable 
differences cannot be ruled out. For there remains the 
question of the means one may prudently or morally 
use in pursuit of these goals. Should we accept an 
incrementalist, one-step-at-a-time approach to the 
abolition of "animal model" research, for example, or 
would acceptance of this approach have the paradoxical 
consequence of prolonging the very practice one 
opposes? And, again, how far may one go in pursuit of 
one's goals? May the law be broken? Is violence ever 
justified? Lewis Gompertz experienced this kind of 
conflict frrst-hand when he was roundly criticized for 
using "informers" to help him prosecute those who 
broke the law, just as today those abolitionists who 
sanction violence and law-breaking must confront the 
condemnation of their more Gandhian peers. 
What is to be done about such conflicts? How, ifat 
all, might people who want to help nonhuman animals 
begin to look past their differences and embrace their 
commonalities? ObViously, there is no easy answer. 
Some differences are real, after all. Still, there may be 
ways of minimizing them, even when they exist, and it 
may be possible for philosophers to find the way. Ryder 
presents one such opportunity for his philosopher-peers. 
Among the contemporary controversies Ryder. 
discusses, one concerns the "What-language-should-
we-use?" question. Should we say that animals "have 
rights," or should we abjure this way of speaking? 
Ryder sides with those who would abjure speaking of 
"animal rights" because, he says, "it seems to me to be 
synthetic and unconvincing-whether applied in the 
human case or otherwise" (p. 328). What it means to 
say that this way of speaking is "synthetic" is never 
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explained, whereas what it means to say that it is 
"unconvincing," so far as Ryder is concerned, seems 
reasonably clear: Ryder simply is not convinced that 
humans or other animals have rights. Very well. But 
why, precisely? Merely to be told by Ryder that he 
regards this way of speaking as "synthetic" is not 
enough. Is there any otherreason? Perhaps. The third 
of the following points may be that reason. 
It is to be noted, first, that by disavowing the 
vocabulary of "rights," Ryder does not see himself as 
having to embrace utilitarianism. For Ryder does not 
think that we can, nor therefore that we should, 
aggregate gains and losses across individuals; that is, 
Ryder does not side with utilitarians when they imply 
that harming one individual can be justified on the 
grounds that other individuals benefit. Here, then, he 
honors the spirit, even as he departs from the letter, of 
"animal rights." 
Second, Ryder distances himself from animal 
rightists, and draws nearer to traditional utilitarians, 
because he thinks that preventable suffering is the core 
concept in ethics; animal rightists, by contrast, are thought 
by Ryder to believe that something other than suffering 
(for example, being used merely as a means, or as a tool, 
or as a resource) is the core concept. Ryder, it seems to 
me, does not do justice to the breadth and depth of the 
philosophical debate in these quarters (see,especially, pp. 
325-329), which makes hisembmce of the utilitarian view, 
as he understands it, even in the limited way in which he 
embraces it, seem possibly impetuous. 
But, third, quite apart from any conceptual or moral 
questions that might be pressed, there is a way to 
understand why an Englishman like Ryder might find 
talk of animal or human rights "synthetic." For there is 
no tradition of individual rights in British moral and 
legal theory or practice, comparable to the one we find 
in America. Here (in America, that is) our moral 
vocabulary and thought, from the founding of this nation 
onward, have been molded around the idea ofindividual 
rights; in other places, and in other times, the situation 
has been markedly different. Thus may it seem, and 
understandably so, that the emphasis on the rights of the 
individual could seem "synthetic" to someone from a 
tradition in which this idea has played a less central role. 
Is there anything that might be learned from this? 
Possibly. If there is, I think it is this: We need to learn 
to accept the inevitability of the plurality of ways of 
thinking and talking morally. For many people, the 
locus of ethics is individual responsibility; for others, 
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caring; for still others, the general welfare; and for still 
others, virtuous character or individual rights. 
Philosophically, there may be a correct way of 
grounding the moral institution of life. This remains a 
live philosophical option. But from a practical point of 
view, we may do better to learn to speak in the tongues 
of the many, foreswearing any presumption that we 
personally are privileged to speak in the language of 
the wise few. In other words, we may do well to 
recognize which ways of talking are likely to seem 
"synthetic" to '" given audience, to explore, both 
thoughtfully and fairly, just how far a given way of 
thinking and talking might take us when it comes to 
animal protection, and to learn, therefore, how extensive 
is the common ground which partisans of alternative 
views might actually share. Philosophers, in short, 
might teach by example when it comes to minimizing 
the sense ofconflict and division that has characterized 
the efforts ofpeople who want to make this world better 
for the nonhuman animals with whom we share it. 
About the future, Ryder is optimistic. "It may take 
thirty or forty years for a movement such as ours to 
turn the great ships ofcommerce and custom, "he writes 
(pp. 331-331), but, he implies, tum them we will-in 
thirty or forty years. This may prove to be overly 
optimistic on Ryder's part even granting him, what is 
debatable, his beliefs that compassion and squeamish-
ness are "innate" human capacities. Moreover, Ryder's 
optimism about the future does not seem to square with 
his explanation about the past. Recall the earlier 
discussion of why animal protection efforts gained 
momentum in Britain during the nineteenth century; 
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the major causes, it seems, were protracted peace and 
material prosperity. 
Peace we thought was at hand when, to everyone's 
relief, the cold war came to an apparent end and (or so 
it was thought) we entered a "new world order." And 
prosperity? Well, once the need to ann ourselves to the 
teeth evaporated, the money left over, the much 
ballyhooed "peace dividend," could be used to educate 
the young, house the poor, tend the elderly, and generally 
to share an abundant material prosperity to more and 
more people. 
Times change. Even as I write this, the United States 
and Iraq remain at war, and the "peace dividend" has 
found its way into anning and supporting upwards of 
500,000combat-ready soldiers. So much for the "peace 
dividend." And so much for helping others prosper 
materially. The plain fact is, the poor are getting poorer, 
those who need housing most are getting less, the elderly 
are being warehoused in institutions of despair, and so 
on. If, then, Ryder is right in believing that peace and 
prosperity are needed if animal protection efforts are to 
meet with success, the present looks more like the worst 
than the best of times for the animals. 
This should hardly be surprising. Making the world 
better for nonhuman animals is not something that can 
be achieved independently of making the world better 
for human beings. The slogan, "Animal liberation is 
human liberation," is more than a slogan. Genuine 
advances in the justice and quality oflife made available 
to the one are inseparable from similar advances made 
for the other. Things do change in the sense that the 
identities of the victims of injustice, whether human or 
otherwise, differover time; but so longas injustice rules, 
whether the victims are humans or other animals, things 
stay the same. 
This is why animal advocates who restrict their time 
and energy to animal liberation might pause to ask, not 
whether our brothers and sisters in fur and feathers and 
ems deserve justice (for they do) but whether they have 
any realistic chance of obtaining it if we are blind to 
the injustice suffered by our brothers and sisters in 
human form. This is not to say that we should abandon 
the other animals and give all our time and energy to 
righting human injustices. This is not to say that at all. 
It is only to say that we need to consider the promise 
and power of a more complete activism. If there is one 
point in Ryder's book about animal advocates of the 
past that is of particular relevance to animal advocates 
of the present, this is it. 
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Response to Regan: 
Sentientism 
Richard D. Ryder 
I am flattered by Tom Regan's very kind and 
interesting review of my book Animal Revolution: 
Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism, not leastbecause 
of his own unparalleled contribution to the cause. I hope 
my work is more than just a history of the animal 
movement; I have tried to introduce some new psycho-
logical, philosophical, and political ideas on the way. 
Regan draws attention to my view that Darwinism 
did not contribute much to the nineteenth century animal 
campaigns. One reason for this was that animal welfare 
had already become, by the 1860's, a part of the British 
orthodox establishment. Darwin was, in effect, fIrmly 
kidnapped by scientific provivisectors like Huxley who 
challenged that orthodoxy. In consequence animal 
welfarists saw Darwin as their enemy rather than friend. 
It was this paradox that struck me as an undergraduate 
at Cambridge in the early 1960's. Why was it that the 
scientists who happily experimented on animals were 
the same people who based their philosophies upon 
Darwinian evolution? Experimentation seemed to me to 
have become the blood ritual of an alternative and 
cannibalistic religion; it preached kinship and yet urged 
the ruthless exploitation of kin. This apparent 
inconsistency rankled inside me until my indignation 
erupted in newspaper letters written in Oxford in 1969 in 
which I spelt out what I considered to be the moral 
implications ofDarwin's message. Ironically, after some 
years of campaigning on this Darwinian basis, I now 
consider that morality is betterbased upon sentiency than 
upon evolutionary kinship. Hence my promotion ofwhat 
I call sentientism-the moral primacy of the individual's 
capacity to feel IXlin or distress regardless as to whether 
these states are experienced by a human, a rat, an alien, 
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